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Abstract: 
Although the legislation for the designation of national parks in England dates back to the 
National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act of 1949, it was not until 1997 that free-
standing and independent national park authorities were established to help manage these 
landscapes. In 2014/15 the ten English national park authorities were allocated £44.6 million 
from the Department for Food, the Environment and Rural Affairs to deliver their 
conservation and recreation purposes and their socio-economic duty. This paper discusses 
how the performance of the national park authorities has been assessed, using 
Northumberland National Park Authority as a case study. 
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80-Word Summary 
Although the methodology behind the English National Park Authorities Performance 
Assessment was flawed, it was accepted that the very process of examination raised 
standards and led to some long-lasting changes. However, the extent to which the resultant 
scores and analysis are meaningful remained open to debate. It was concluded that the 
assessment of performance was more about compliance than genuine improvement. 
Looking ahead, the challenge to the National Park Authorities is to devise robust 
performance assessment methodologies that are fit-for-purpose. 
 
Article 
The movement to designate parts of the English countryside as national parks gathered 
momentum after Second World War. The founding legislation for the English national parks 
was the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act of 1949. These stated two 
purposes for the national parks: to conserve and enhance natural beauty, wildlife and 
cultural heritage; and to promote opportunities for the understanding and enjoyment of the 
special qualities of the national parks by the public. The ensuing years saw seven national 
parks designated in England. However, the 1949 Act did not harmonize the governance 
structure by which the national parks would operate. Only the Peak District National Park 
and the Lake District National Park were run as boards with a greater degree of 
independence from the conventional local authorities. In the other areas, joint committees of 
the local authorities were appointed when a national park lay within the area of more than 
one local authority, or a single committee when the national park lay within one local 
authority area. With increasing pressures on the countryside (for example, in changing land 
management practices, the use of the space for military training, and a growth in outdoor 
recreation), the Local Government Act of 1972 resulted in the appointment of national park 
officers (now usually referred to as chief executives) and professional teams to develop a 
management plan. This arrangement remained until the Environment Act of 1995, which 
acted upon recommendations of the Fit for the Future report (Edwards, 1991) to legislate for 
the establishment of standalone national park authorities, and to underpin the two national 
park purposes with a new socio-economic duty. These special purpose local authorities 
became fully independent and were created for all of the English national parks. With the 
additions of the Broads (1987), the New Forest (2004) and the South Downs (2010), there 
are now 10 national parks in England covering 10.7 percent of the land area. In 2014/15, the 
collective annual core budget for the national park authorities to achieve their objectives was 
£44.6 million, entirely allocated from the Department for Food, Environment and Affairs 
(Defra) (Table 1), and supplemented by additional external funds from other distributors on 
an ad-hoc basis (usually project based). This paper will explore how the performance of the 
national park authorities in delivering their purposes and duty has been assessed in recent 
years, with a particular focus on a case study of Northumberland National Park Authority. 
 
 
Table 1. Annual English National Park Grants, 2007-2015. All Authorities lever-in external funds 
from other funding distributors to supplement their Defra allocation. Source: National Parks 
England, 2015.  
 
Evaluating a special purpose local authority 
For 2014/15, local government in England was responsible for a revenue expenditure budget 
of £98.8 billion (DCLG, 2014), a significant sum even after the public sector cuts of 30 per 
cent to 40 per cent since 2010. The challenge of devising a methodology for measuring the 
  English National Park Grant (£millions) 
 2012 
Population 
2007/ 
08 
2008/ 
09 
2009/ 
10 
2010/ 
11 
2011/ 
12 
2012/ 
13 
2013/ 
14 
2014/ 
15 
Broads 6,271 £4.1 £4.3 £4.3 £4.2 £4.0 £3.7 £3.5 £3.2 
Dartmoor 34,000 £4.5 £4.7 £4.8 £4.7 £4.5 £4.2 £4.0 £3.6 
Exmoor 10,600 £3.8 £4.0 £4.1 £4.0 £3.8 £3.5 £3.3 £3.0 
Lake District 40,800 £6.6 £6.9 £7.0 £7.1 £6.5 £6.2 £5.8 £5.2 
New Forest 34,922 £3.7 £4.0 £4.3 £5.0 £3.8 £3.6 £3.4 £3.0 
Northumberland 2,200 £3.2 £3.3 £3.4 £3.3 £3.1 £3.0 £2.8 £2.5 
North York Moors 23,380 £5.2 £5.4 £5.5 £5.4 £5.1 £4.8 £4.6 £4.0 
Peak District 37,905 £7.9 £8.3 £8.5 £8.3 £7.9 £7.4 £7.0 £6.3 
South Downs 120,000 / / / £8.5 £11.3 £11.0 £10.6 £9.8 
Yorkshire Dales 19,654 £5.2 £5.3 £5.5 £5.4 £5.1 £4.8 £4.5 £4.0 
Total 329,732 £44.2 £46.2 £47.4 £55.9 £55.1 £52.2 £49.5 £44.6 
performance of local government has been the subject of much discussion in the local 
government literature (Boyne, 2003; Boyne and Gould-Williams, 2003; Feiock and Jang, 
2009; Micheli and Neely, 2010). This has been particularly so after the New Labour 
Government introduced a series of Best Value indicators from 2000 (replaced in 2008 by the 
National Indicator Set) and the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) from 2002 
(replaced in 2009 by the Comprehensive Area Assessment). The CPA was developed by the 
Audit Commission, an independent body, and the process approximated a performance 
score for a wide range of local services, using a simple to understand five-category scale 
(Revelli, 2010). In 2010, the Coalition Government replaced the National Indicator Set with a 
single and comprehensive list of data, whilst Comprehensive Area Assessments were 
replaced with self-assessments and the publication of performance data. Both new 
measures were designed to be inexpensive and transparent. 
 
For the national park authorities, established in 1997, some form of performance evaluation 
needed to be created. The options were either for Defra to undertake this process, or for the 
national park authorities to develop their own form of assessment. The modernisation 
agenda that took place at the start of the 21st century (Laffin, 2008) provided impetus for the 
national park authorities to pursue the latter option, to develop the National Park Authorities 
Performance Assessment (NPAPA) to measure their own performance as special purpose 
local authorities. The first round of assessments took place in 2005/06. Although the NPAPA 
methodology largely drew upon the CPA methodology it was refined to fit national park 
purposes. Even though local government organizations moved away from the CPA in 2009, 
the NPAPA continued and a second round of assessments took place between 2010 and 
2012. 
 
The second round of the NPAPA assessments was conducted following a series of stages: 
 
 An independent consultant was appointed by National Parks England, the umbrella 
body for the ten national park authorities, to oversee all the assessments. The 
consultant chosen was Solace Enterprises. 
 The national park authority under scrutiny published a self-assessment report, based 
around categories agreed across the national park family (as shown in Table 2). 
 A team of five people was appointed to make the external assessment, as agreed by 
Solace Enterprises and National Parks England. For the second round of 
assessments, the team consisted of three lead officers from other national park 
authorities, a representative from a local government organization, and a contact 
from Solace Enterprises (to ensure consistency). Documentary information was 
circulated, including the self-assessment, the five-year management plan, the three-
year business plan, and the annual corporate plan, leading up to a visit to the 
national park and the authority for one week. During this time they undertook a tour 
of the area and had discussions with staff and partners. 
 At the end of the week, the team reported back some emerging findings to the 
national park authority, and shortly after that, published their report. 
 
The national park authority (NPA) that was being assessed would then have to act upon the 
findings of the report, publishing a performance improvement plan. The emphasis of the 
NPAPA was on the national park authorities learning from each other. Since the NPAPA is 
based on the CPA methodology, a lot of strengths and weakness of that approach would be 
replicated. Therefore in order to assess the effectiveness of the NPAPA, it is worth 
considering the CPA in more detail as a tool to measure local government performance. 
 
Evaluating the evaluation 
The start of the 21st Century marked the beginning of a new dawn of local government 
evaluation. A series of indicators, called Best Value, were developed to record data, 
alongside a new assessment procedure, the CPA. There were three main reasons why Best 
Value performance indicators were introduced: to set benchmarks and targets; to provide 
local electors with a basis for measuring performance; and to provide central government 
with a mechanism for monitoring and regulating local government (Boyne, 2000; Boyne, 
2002; Nunn, 2007). Right from the start there were problems of interpretation around the 
word ‘effectiveness’, and the difficult task of satisfying the multiplicity of local government 
stakeholders (Boyne, 2002). Further questions arose around whether the assessments 
should focus on the processes at work, or the impact or effect on an area (Goodland et al., 
2005). Meanwhile the ‘plethora’ of performance indicators (Gutiérrez-Romero et al., 2008: 
767) became the subject of ‘gaming’, in the sense that it was possible to hit targets, yet miss 
the point, or reduce performance where targets did not apply (Bevan and Hood, 2006). In 
their own research on performance indicators, Bevan and Hood (2006: 115) also found that 
a performance manager of a local government organization prioritized ‘quick-win’ activities 
because it promoted the score of the organization without incurring too much effort. Aside 
from the gaming aspects, Bevan and Hood (2006: 116) pointed out the whole contradiction 
of government policy: 
 
Central government is rewarding local authorities in poor areas for their deprivation, and 
punishing them for their poor CPA scores. And rich areas are being rewarded for their good 
CPA scores and punished for the lack of deprivation. Government policy comes dangerously 
close to being self-defeating. 
 
For instance, by 2005 the Audit Commission had judged almost three-quarters of unitary and 
upper tier authorities to be ‘good’ or ‘excellent’, although public satisfaction in local 
government was declining (Martin and Bovaird, 2005). It was also stressed that changes in 
performance take time to be realized (John, 2004; Gains et al., 2005). Yet once a set of 
modernisation initiatives appeared not to have succeeded, central policy makers were quick 
to replace them with another set (Laffin, 2008). 
 
A further critique of the CPA process was its apparent inability to take account of 
circumstances beyond the control of local policy makers. Whereas some local government 
organizations were falsely lauded for operating in favourable circumstances, others had 
been wrongly criticized for their performance during difficult economic times (Andrews et al., 
2005; Gutiérrez-Romero et al., 2008; Leach, 2010). There was also an argument, that is 
particularly pertinent to the national park authorities, in that assessors were not comparing 
like for like (Gutiérrez-Romero et al., 2008: 775): 
 
It is likely to be harder for authorities to provide services to a geographically dispersed area. 
With regards to population size, there may be benefits of having a sizeable population, 
because [of] the principle of ‘economies of scale’. 
 
It was argued that rich authorities are able to ‘buy’ better CPA scores (Gutiérrez-Romero et 
al., 2008). Despite this unevenness, in constructing a methodology for performance 
judgements, policy makers created a competitive process where similar organizations were 
considered together. Rather than challenge the validity of this process, each local authority 
sought to maximize its CPA judgement compared to other local authorities (Davis, 2011). 
 
In the following section we examine a case study of the evaluation of the performance of 
Northumberland National Park Authority. Through this analysis we demonstrate how some of 
the criticisms made of the CPA process in local government are also pertinent to critically 
examining the benefits and shortcoming of the NPAPA. This is because the process adopted 
drew heavily on the CPA method despite the initial emphasis on the NPAs themselves 
leading the process. The analysis contained in this paper draws on a combination of 
participant observation (the lead author was an employee of the Authority at the time of the 
inspection), documentary analysis of the NPAPA ‘results’ and interviews with key 
stakeholders conducted as part of the larger project on partnership working in national parks.   
 Evaluating Northumberland National Park Authority 
Northumberland National Park is the most northerly of the English parks comprising an area 
of 1,048 square kilometres of remote upland. The Park was designated in 1956 with the 
National Park Authority becoming an independent, freestanding organization in 1997. Prior 
to this the Park was administered by a committee of Northumberland County Council. The 
population of the Park is 2,200, the fewest of any UK national park. In reality the NPA works 
extensively with communities on the fringe of the Park (nearer 29,000 people in total). This 
work draws on what the NPA itself terms an ‘action area’ approach that recognizes the 
interdependence between particular areas of the Park and ‘gateway’ communities outside 
the formal boundary (NNPA, 2009). Despite this, the national park grant is still allocated on 
the basis of the 2,200 people actually inside the national park. In 2014/15, it received the 
lowest share of the English national park pot from Defra, at just 5.6% of the total funds.  
 
Northumberland NPA was subject to an NPAPA inspection in 2010. This was the second 
NPAPA that the Authority had participated in. The 2010 results are summarized in table 2. 
 
 Self-
Assessment 
Score 
External 
Assessment 
Score 
Quality of Vision 4 4 
Setting and Using Priorities 4 3 
Conservation  3 3 
Promoting Understanding and Service Delivery 4 2 
Wider Sustainable Development 4 4 
Use of Resources 4 3 
Leadership and Improving Performance 3 3 
 
Table 2. A comparison of scores across a range of performance categories for the 
Northumberland National Park Authority self assessment and the external assessment. The 
ratings are: (1) performs poorly; (2) performs adequately; (3) performs well; and (4) performs 
excellently. Sources: NNPA, 2010; Solace Enterprises, 2010. 
 
It is interesting to note that the self-assessment scores are generally the same or higher than 
the external assessment score. There are a number of factors that may have affected the 
comparatively high self-assessment scores. The imperative driving the conduct of NPAPA, 
mirroring that of the CPA, encouraged authorities to avoid the stigma of seeming to be 
underperforming and encouraged them to reflect on their work in the best possible light. 
Furthermore, in 2010 the Authority was facing the largest funding cuts in its history and 
members of staff were only too aware of the threat of involuntary redundancies. Therefore, 
common sense would dictate that staff would want to present their own areas of work as 
successful. In addition, and as was noted many years earlier by MacEwen and MacEwen 
(1987), national park authority staff do not have comparable salary gradings to equivalent 
officers at local councils. Given that members of staff are relatively under paid, to then be 
told that they were performing adequately or poorly may result in dissatisfaction. This could 
range from a general decrease in morale of those affected, to even opening discussions with 
union officials to challenge the validity of the self-assessment. In summary, the very process 
of self-assessment put the Authority in a difficult position, resulting in high scores across the 
board. In all likelihood, the Authority took a pragmatic view of the self-assessment process, 
knowing that in some cases different results would be revealed with the subsequent 
independent assessment. The whole self-assessment process is multi-faceted, with 
implications that go beyond simply measuring performance.  
 
When the particular context of Northumberland is considered it also becomes apparent it is 
hard to make an objective appraisal of performance that allows meaningful comparison 
across the NPAs. National parks were given a socio-economic duty in 1995, yet the extent to 
which this duty can reasonably be pursued in Northumberland is somewhat difficult given the 
lack of people and businesses. It also has the smallest national park grant, therefore the 
fewest members of staff (and following the spending cuts of 2010, the size of the Authority 
reduced from 65 to 46 full-time equivalent core-funded members of staff). This theme of the 
importance of a complex context to performance is further developed through examining two 
areas of the NPAPA findings: the achievement of sustainable development; and the success 
of its partnership working, the latter of which is a cross-cutting area. 
 
The NPAPA review did not make an attempt to define what sustainable development is, or 
what success looks like, despite concluding that the Authority’s work in this field was 
‘exemplar’ (Solace Enterprises, 2010: 12). It would be fair to assume that the NPAPA team 
took a broad view to sustainable development and favoured the innovative ‘action areas’ of 
the Authority. 
 
The Authority has been ambitious in setting its objectives wider than just the national 
park boundaries. The Authority has a very clear view that its ability to deliver its 
statutory purposes is highly dependent on the social and environmental well-being of 
communities outside its boundary and, to a lesser extent, within the wider region 
(Solace Enterprises, 2010: 6). 
 
The NPAPA concluded that the Authority was ‘extremely effective in engaging local 
communities’ and as a consequence has ‘produced many local sustainable development 
initiatives’ (Solace Enterprises, 2010: 11). However, the NPAPA team went on to say that 
improvements could be made around the operation of the ‘action areas’, specifically to do 
with governance, boundary definition, maintaining community support, and evaluating of the 
benefits of this innovative approach. The achievement of sustainable development at 
Northumberland National Park Authority scored the maximum 4 out of 4 in its quantitative 
assessment. 
 
In reviewing the delivery of sustainable development, the value of the process could be 
critically examined on a number of levels. It is very difficult to define what sustainable 
development is and how it can achieved, so to assess and provide a score is highly 
subjective. One could also question whether the NPAPA review team could reasonably 
conclude in the space of a week that an organization is effective in engaging with local 
communities. It is very difficult assertion to make and could be open to challenge. Hence the 
NPAPA process in this case seemed to take account of the difficult context in which 
Northumberland NPA was working, rewarding them for taking a different approach in the 
score given. The NPAPA seemed to avoid some the rigidities associated with the CPA 
process noted above. However, the ‘results’ for sustainable development, alongside the 
analysis of the process, point to the seeming superficiality with which authoritative 
statements are made on a major ongoing area of work. 
 
Another difficult and cross-cutting area to assess was the ability of the Authority to 
successfully work in partnership with others. The results were mixed with praise for the 
management plan partnership and an acknowledgment that there was room for clarity in 
defining partnership roles. 
 
The Management Plan Partnership, established to oversee the delivery of the 
management plan, now provides a strong guiding and monitoring role (Solace 
Enterprises, 2010: 5). 
 
The role and connection of some key partners is not clear. There are organizations 
whose role as defined key partners, or as delivery bodies, is not clearly translated to 
activity and there may be a mismatch in organizational expectations that could 
benefit from clarification. This includes organizations that do not have an obvious 
contribution to the delivery of the wider objectives, and organizations who feel they 
could do much more to connect with the work of the Authority and in the achievement 
of its priorities (Solace Enterprises, 2010: 8). 
 
Furthermore, there was criticism of its approach to working with others, which was 
interpreted as heavy handed at times. 
 
Partner contributions were not always secured to best effect. On a small number of 
occasions the Authority managers are so clear about what they want from discussion 
that they seem less likely to want to hear other partners’ positions. This can cause 
frustration with partners who prefer, and are used to, Authority staff being more 
collaborative in their working (Solace Enterprises, 2010: 9).  
 
This judgement is also open to challenge on the basis of the evidence base on which the 
NPAPA could draw on in the time available to it. It is also difficult to see how the 
performance of different NPAs with regard to partnership working can be meaningfully 
compared through the NPAPA process. Assessors looking for a ‘one-size-fits-all solution’ 
(Laffin, 2008: 121) are likely to the disappointed by the impossibility of this task. The 
complexity of the relationships involved also make it difficult for assessors with tightly limited 
resources to make credible judgements because such a wide range of different stakeholders 
are involved in the National Park. The literature points to how local authorities had strong 
incentives to engage in partnership working because it was an object of inspection under the 
CPA. Likewise partnership working has been an imperative pushed by Defra and strongly 
pursued by those leading NPAs. Although the voluntary sector may have the incentive of 
attracting possible grants, other statutory agencies and the private sector have little incentive 
to push the partnership working agenda to the same degree. Any analysis of partnership 
working requires a methodology which takes into account the politics surrounding the 
formation and operation of a wide range of partnerships. This requires a level of detail not 
possible through the NPAPA. 
 
Gutiérrez-Romero et al. (2008: 771) described the whole CPA process as ‘based on a 
narrow methodological format.’ This was echoed by Leach (2010) who saw fundamental 
issues around subjective variables, such as focus, ambitions and future plans. Examining 
the Northumberland NPA case study we can make parallel arguments regarding the 
superficiality of the NPAPA scores and narratives. Those conducting the review had 
appropriate expertise and took into account the context in which the Authority worked but the 
process itself did not allow for the kind of detailed exploration that would be required to 
provide a rigorous analysis of performance in the two key areas we have examined. 
 
Conclusion: compliance or improvement? 
Even if it is accepted that the methodology behind the CPA and the NPAPA are flawed, the 
progressive intent has been acknowledged (Bovaird, 2008; Revelli, 2010; Davis, 2011; 
Lawless, 2012). It could be argued that the very process of examination has raised 
standards and led to some long-lasting changes. Indeed, if the intention of introducing 
assessments was to destabilize local government, to unlearn old ways and embrace the new 
ways of working introduced by the New Labour Governments (Laffin, 2008: 119), then these 
objectives were achieved. This was as much the case with NPAs as special purpose 
authorities as with conventional local government. The question remains, however, of how 
meaningful the resultant scores and analysis that the NPAPA generated are given the 
narrowness of the process and the complexity of some the areas of working examined. 
 
As of 2015, the contract between National Park England and Solace Enterprises has 
expired. Even if the findings of the NPAPA are open for debate, the process has seemingly 
given Defra the confidence that the national park family can undertake its own assessments. 
In this sense, the assessments were more about compliance than genuine improvement 
(Moxham, 2013), and it seems that the overall reason for undertaking the reviews has 
become confused. Although there will always be room to refine and improve evaluation 
methodology, there was no doubt in the eyes of key stakeholders interviewed that in 
undertaking assessments standards of delivery have been raised. The problem remains, 
however, of how to create ‘benchmarks’ in a context where authorities even in the same 
‘family’ have markedly uneven levels of resourcing and work in different socio-economic and 
well as physical environments. The challenge is perhaps open to NPAs, and other special 
purpose organizations, to development performance assessment methodologies which, 
rather than following the conventions of ‘mainstream’ local government, lead the way in 
balancing the need for thorough and critical review with an appreciation of context. 
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